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This paper presents the necessary conditions to ensure a minimal profitability of carrier-led 
consolidation strategies in urban distribution. These conditions are shown by compact formulas 
obtained by continuous approximations representing the cost of the stakeholders involved: 
society, regular carriers, consolidation facility operator and environment. The domain of the 
retailer density variable that always produces negative effects on each stakeholder has been 
identified. The envelope of this domain does not depend on vehicle costs and other site-related 
parameters. On the other hand, there is a critical density of receivers that makes the carrier cost 
savings higher than the CF operator costs.  
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1. Introduction 
The predominance of population concentration in urban areas was achieved for first time in the human 
history in 2008 (UNFPA, 2007). From this time on, world population is expected to continue 
concentrating in cities or metropolitan areas due to incremental access to economic opportunities and 
services (UNFPA, 2012). Cities must provide efficient networks of these basic services to meet the near 
future citizens’ needs at a reasonable cost. This is the case of the urban goods distribution. In order to 
improve its efficiency and to reduce externalities, local governments have been implementing 
heterogeneous innovative measures, through urban mobility plans or using national or supranational 
funds. City managers have done a great effort in developing detailed ex-post evaluation methodologies to 
comprehend the results, derive lessons to other implementations and benchmark the best practices in city 
logistics. Unfortunately, ex-ante estimations of these urban goods measures are seldom provided. The 
cause-effect relationships are not studied and there is no estimation of the required conditions to 
guarantee the achievement of the objectives. 
 
Consolidation strategies are one set of measures that can improve the efficiency and reduce the 
externalities caused by freight vehicles in urban areas (Browne et al, 2005). The basic idea is to 
consolidate goods in new or existing facilities before the distribution to the final customers is done. This 
way, the number of freight vehicles and their mileage within an urban area are reduced by grouping the 
shipments of different delivering routes into a single vehicle covering the destination area. However, 
there is a major challenge for the success of consolidation strategies: which stakeholder leads the 
consolidation and how the new distribution costs of the consolidation facility are compensated by the 
stakeholders that experience a cost reduction.  
 
In Holguín-Veras and Sánchez-Díaz (2016), two different kinds of organizational implementation of 
consolidation strategies are identified. On one hand, receiver-led consolidation strategies, where the major 
decision role relies on receivers. A common example is when the manager of a great pole freight attractor 
(commercial malls, hospitals, huge office buildings) reorganizes the upstream supply chains, reducing the 
number of deliveries in this facility. This measure may reduce the number of in-bound routes but it does 
not need any collaboration among carriers.  
 
On the other hand, carrier-led consolidation strategies, where receivers are physically scattered in the 
urban area and they are not organized under a common framework or legal body. In that case, multiple 
carriers use a consolidation facility to deliver goods in the distribution area. Each carrier is responsible for 
performing multiple deliveries to a subset of these receivers (Nathanail et al, 2012). Indeed, these 
strategies cause significant changes in the inbound supply chains at the facility, as well as in the outbound 
local distribution routes, from the facility to the final customers. Interurban vehicles just need to stop once 
at this facility to deliver all goods to receivers located in this area. In this facility, the shipments are 
consolidated and a common fleet distributes them to the final destinations. Consolidation strategies imply 
some level of collaboration among carriers since their parcels are combined in the common fleet for last-
mile delivery or, at least, are handled in a shared space in the consolidation facility. However, the natural 
competition of carriers makes this kind of consolidation strategies more complex than the receiver-led. 
The main objective of carrier-led consolidation measure is to increase the load factor in the last mile 
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distribution, to reduce the number of gross vehicles in the area and to reduce the environmental impacts 
of the freight distribution while maintaining the level of service. 
 
A well-known example of these carrier-led consolidation strategies is the controversial Urban 
Consolidation Center (UCC) concept or also named Urban Logistic Spaces (ULS). They are medium 
logistic facilities located in the neighborhood of the distribution area in which deliveries are consolidated. 
In Browne et al (2005) a deep analysis of the potentialities and major weaknesses of UCC is presented. In 
spite of the promising expected results, one of the major challenges is the necessary funding to afford the 
set-up facility cost. Moreover, this measure implies new handling costs as well as time penalty for all 
shipments to be distributed through UCCs. The economic impacts on multiple stakeholders involved in 
several UCC trials have not been deeply estimated. It has resulted in unfeasible business models. In fact, 
more than 100 implementation of this kind all over the world were reported, but just 12 are still in service 
(Allen et al., 2012). Several contributions present a quantified assessment of the impacts of UCC in 
specific implementation in Europe, North American and Japan cities (Paddeu et al, 2014, Köhler, 2001, 
Kawamura and Lu,  2008, Chen et al,  2012, Browne et al, 2007, and Gonzalez-Feliu and Morana, 2011). 
These results apply to each case study and it is difficult to extrapolate the achievements to other physical 
contexts.   
Alternatively, the concept of Urban Stage Areas, uSA, (referred as Espace Logistique de Proximité in 
France) has succeeded in the recent years as a consolidation strategy (Holguín-Veras et al. 2008). It 
overcomes the funding problem of building a new unaffordable consolidation facility. A container or 
other small non-expensive storage structure is installed in an existing facility inside a city center (for 
example, a parking garage). Vehicles drop the products to be delivered in the adjacent area of this facility 
and, in a second stage, other environmentally-friendly vehicles from the same company deliver them to 
the final retailers. Even, this last mile distribution can be made by foot. In Janjevic et al (2013), the 
special features of ULS are analyzed. 
 
The estimation of the logistic cost savings from carrier-led consolidation strategies is addressed in several 
contributions based on continuous approximations of the network distribution variables (Daganzo 1988a, 
b, and Campbell, 1990). Saberi and Verbas (2012) presented a similar approach aimed at minimizing the 
emissions of the freight transportation vehicles due to carrier-led consolidation policies. Roca-Riu et al 
(2012) and Roca-Riu et al (2016) analyzed the effect of equal and non-equal market share carriers 
demand in the whole transportation network. The total transportation cost variation at local and line-haul 
network are estimated. These contributions provide a useful tool to approximate the total cost of both 
systems and therefore the operational savings. More recently, Janjevic and Ndiaye (2016) define the 
generalized cost of regular carriers when they route their parcels through UCC. This generalized cost is 
obtained as an analytical estimation of the time and distance- related cost as well as the service fare. 
Unfortunately, there is not any analysis of the consolidation effect on the profitability of each stakeholder 
involved and the necessary cash flows among them. In this paper, we would like to study how the cost 
incurred by each agent (mainly carriers and consolidation facility operator) changes due to the 
consolidation strategy and what novel cash flows among stakeholders ensure the profitability for each 
participating agent. Zhou et al. (2011) analyzed the cost savings and the optimal price setting of 
companies. Although the study is developed for the long-haul network, they define an economic model 
where the product substitutability among carriers is addressed, considering price setting and discount 
offer. In the urban context, Krajewska and Kopfer (2006) and Krajewska et al. (2008) addressed the cost 
allocation problem among companies. This problem studies the distribution of new costs and its benefits 
due to the collaborative process among participants. The methodological framework of this approach 
considers both combinatorial auctions and operational research game theory. Unfortunately, these latter 
contributions do not provide insights about how the distribution network should be designed to exploit the 
economies of scale of consolidation facilities at a specific site.  
 
The aim of this paper is to define the necessary conditions to ensure a minimum profitability of the 
carrier-led consolidation strategies for carriers, the consolidation facility operator, environment and 
society. These conditions are determined using a set of compact formulas involving the logistic cost 
estimation and the cash flow among stakeholders. Cost estimations are compared between the regular 
service and the service with consolidation facilities. Formulas depend on the key characteristics of the 
urban site and distribution network: demand and size of parcels, size and type of fleet, local and line-haul 
speeds, unit cost parameters of the resources involved (time, distance, infrastructure, …) and the fares to 
use the consolidation facility. In Section 2, there is a comprehensive analysis of the economic and 
organizational relationships among the key stakeholders involved in consolidation strategies. Section 3 
presents an analytic model to estimate the cost variation incurred by stakeholders due to the participation 
in a consolidation facility. Section 4 shows the necessary conditions to implement consolidation 
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strategies, ensuring a positive profitability for all stakeholders. Section 5 analyzes a generic case study. 
Finally, the major modeling and applicability conclusions are drawn in Section 6. 
 
2. Stakeholders and their relationships 
The promotion of a consolidation strategy represents a new scheme in the logistics system of a city, 
changing the roles and the logistic cost allocation among stakeholders involved. In this paper, we will 
focus on carrier-led consolidation strategies and two typologies of consolidation facilities will be studied: 
Urban Consolidation Centers (UCC) and Urban Stage Areas (uSA). From now on, we will use 
indistinctively the term Consolidation Facility (CF).  
 
According to Holguin-Veras and Sánchez-Diaz (2016), the main stakeholders that determine the 
economic characteristics of urban distribution service are the suppliers and receivers. They represent the 
producer and the consumer of the supply chain under analysis. The economic relations between 
production and consumption are the key to understand the behavior of carriers and how distribution 
services are organized. However, carrier-led consolidation strategies which use a consolidation facility 
imply a new stakeholder in the supply chain: the operator of the consolidation facility (CF operator).  
 
In Figure 1, the basic relationships among stakeholders are depicted, identifying the economic, physical 
and regulatory layers placing the stakeholders and defining their relationships. The overall list of 
variables used throughout the paper are listed in Appendix 1. Subscripts C and CF refer to carrier and CF 
operator respectively. Basically, in the economic layer, each economic relationship k between supplier 
and receiver determines the amount of products to be delivered yk , the frequency of shipments, the pick-
up/delivery time, and the time horizon (Hk) that carrier i must fulfill. Reciprocally, carrier i defines the 
transportation fare θC(k) to route this parcel through the physical network and adapt their fleet (VC), 
schedule and routes (RC) to fulfill the requirements of the former stakeholders in order to visit Ni  receiver 
locations. On the regulation layer, local governments foster carrier-led consolidation measures due to the 
improvement of the quality of life in the area (less congestion, less emissions). These sets of compulsory 
measures (χL ) are usually intended for carriers, constraining VC, RC.  
 
Hence, the agents that foresee a completely different economic balance due to consolidation strategies are 
those that operate the physical distribution network, i.e. carriers and CF operator. When they move a 
fraction µ of the total receivers Ni  from a traditional network to the new consolidated supply chain, they 
only operate the line-haul service from distribution centers to the urban CF. Then, the CF operator 
handles the transfer operations of goods from inbound CF operator routes (interurban) and performs the 
local routes in the urban area to deliver goods to the final receivers. This stakeholder incurs the 
investment cost of the facility construction and the operational cost of the last-mile distribution. The last-
mile distribution routes RCF  and fleet VCF  from this consolidation facility must fulfill the requirements of 
receivers as well as the specific regulations imposed by local authorities (χCF).  
 
However, the key question in this analysis is how the total cost sustained by the CF operator is balanced 
by incomes or compensations in order to ensure a positive profitability for all stakeholders. We consider 
that the CF operator charges a fare θCF (k) to the parcel corresponding to the k-th supplier-receiver 
relationship served through the consolidation facility. This fare could be complemented by a subsidy 
(S CF ) from the local authority (Kin et al, 2016, Lebeau et al, 2015) or other incomes to ensure a positive 
profit for the CF operator (i.e., advertisement, storage, …).  
 
 
 Figure 1: Economic and physical relationship among stakeholders 
Carrier i
(VC) =f(Hk,yk,Ni)  
CF operator   
(VCF)=f(Hk,uk,µNi) 
Local 
government
Supplier Receiver  
{Hk, yk}
{µNi}
{θCF(i)}
χL χCF{SCF}
Economic layer
Physical layer
Regulatory layer
{θC,(k)}
k-th Economic relation
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3. Consolidation modeling approach 
In this section, the cost variation due to the consolidation facilities is estimated. Formulas are developed 
to assess the temporal and distance costs difference between regular distribution and the distribution 
through a Consolidation Facility (CF). We refer as a regular distribution the supply of goods from 
distribution centers directly to the final receivers. The basic equations estimating the logistic cost of 
regular distribution are firstly developed for a single carrier. Later, we introduce the case where different 
market share carriers operate in the same area of the city in the regular distribution. Finally, we analyze 
the effects of the CF service on the overall costs of carriers under competition.   
3.1. Single carrier 
We consider that one carrier has to visit N receivers located in a rectangular zone of a city of area  A=𝑙𝑙𝑥𝑥 · 
𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦, where 𝑙𝑙𝑥𝑥, 𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦 correspond to each rectangle side length, respectively. Let δ be the spatial density of 
receivers in the area of study.  The key assumptions of the methodological approach are:  
• Receivers are uniformly distributed over the region of service 𝑙𝑙𝑥𝑥𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦, so that δ=N/A is considered 
uniform in all area of service. The delivery area is assumed to be a square, circle, or a shape that 
is not very elongated. 
• The maximal allowable parcel volume to be served in regular distribution is ymax . Parcels greater 
than this threshold are transported through an alternative supply chain devoted to special 
shipments. Let yi  be the volume of the parcel requested by each receiver i (i=1, …, N) and F(y) 
the cumulative distribution function of parcels whose volume is less or equal to ymax  in the total 
area of service, satisfying F(y=0)=0 and F(y=ymax)=1.   
• Each receiver has the same probability of requesting a shipment of volume y (0≤y≤ymax). 
Moreover, the expected value of the parcel volume served by carrier in the region is estimated by 
𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦) = ∫ 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 (𝑦𝑦)𝑑𝑑𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚0  , where f(y) is the corresponding probability density function of parcel 
volume. We generally assume that F(y) and f(y) are deterministic functions that can be directly 
obtained from the data of those parcels served by the carrier. 
• Carriers will use a homogeneous fleet of volume capacity C. As a difference from Daganzo 
(1984a, 1984b, 2005), the vehicle capacity C is defined as the total volume of parcels that one 
vehicle can carry whereas C/E(y) is the expected maximal number of receivers that one tour is 
able to visit.  
• Vehicle tours are designed within the time horizon H. It captures the available time period in 
which receivers admit the deliveries during the day. 
• Vehicles depart from a depot (distribution center) located at distance ρ from the center of the 
service area. As a difference from Daganzo (1984b) and Robusté et al (1990), we assumed that 
the depot is deployed outside the city boundaries (𝜌𝜌 > √𝐴𝐴); therefore we cannot consider it is 
located near the center of the region to be served.  
• Given the density of streets in urban areas, we use the L1  metric to determine the distance 
evaluation in the service area for the simplicity. We assume that vehicles may detour an extra 
distance β in each tour due to the single direction of streets or access regulations. This term 
could be important in historical centers with a compact road street network and one-way streets. 
In Holroyd (1965), there are several routing factor equivalences between distance estimations 
provided for different street network shapes and metrics.  
 
The design of carrier routes in the regular distribution is aimed at minimizing the generalized cost of the 
trip. The region is firstly partitioned in clusters of approximately shipment volume S, each of one 
presenting S/E(y) receivers as an average. Therefore, decision variable S is limited by temporal and 
capacity constraints (parameters C and H). We will refer as line-haul distance to the total distance run 
from the distribution center to the central point of each urban distribution area by the whole fleet. On the 
other side, local distance is the distance covered during the delivery of parcels within the cluster of 
receivers. Newell and Daganzo (1986) proposed a simple (non-optimal) strategy for visiting the points 
contained in zones elongated towards the distribution center. Zones are rectangles with sides 2w and P, 
which constitute a partition of the whole delivery region. If vehicles visit receivers at full load and there is 
no time limitation, the number of receivers in the rectangle should be C/E(y), which should be equivalent 
to 2wPδ, expressed in terms of density. However, we might be also interested in reducing the average 
number of points to S/E(y) to satisfy the time horizon H. 
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Figure 2. Scheme of the receiver partition in the regular distribution network of one carrier.  
From the contributions of Daganzo (1984a,b) and adding the line-haul, local distances and detour 
distance, we obtain an approximation of the total distance traveled per receiver, d (Equation 1). In the 
case of Figure 2, parameter β could be approximated by the available street spacing in the transversal 
direction between two adjacent bands.  
𝑑𝑑 = 𝑤𝑤3 + 1𝛿𝛿𝑤𝑤+ 2𝜌𝜌𝑆𝑆/𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦) + 𝛽𝛽𝑆𝑆/𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦) (1) 
Using vL , vLH  and τ as urban speed inside the local service area, interurban speed from the distribution 
center to the service area, and the unloading/loading time per receiver respectively, the total time per 
receiver (t) is estimated in Equation (2): 
𝑡𝑡 = 2𝜌𝜌𝐸𝐸 (𝑦𝑦)
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
+ 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦)
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿
+ 1
𝑤𝑤𝛿𝛿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿
+ 𝑤𝑤3𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿 + 𝜏𝜏  (2) 
Therefore, the carrier is aimed at minimizing transportation cost while the service is maintained to all 
receivers. We consider cd  and ct  as the distance and time-related unit costs respectively. If we let DLH , DL  
and T be the total line-haul distance, total local distance and total travel time, Equation (3) determines the 
objective function to be minimized for a single carrier. min 𝑍𝑍(𝑤𝑤, 𝑆𝑆) =  min[𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑(𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿 + 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) + 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇] (3) 
The decision variables are: the dimension of the vehicle zone delivery partition (w) and the vehicle 
volume load (S). The expressions of the optimal distances and the travel time that one carrier need to 
travel to visit N receivers are provided in equations (4)-(6) respectively. In Appendix 2, the 
methodological approach to obtain the former formulas is presented. The term [𝑁𝑁/𝜓𝜓]+ captures the 
integer number of tours needed to serve all receivers, where the mathematical operator [𝑥𝑥]+ gives the 
smallest integer greater than or equal to x. 
𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿 = 2√3 (𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁)1/2 + 𝛽𝛽 �𝑵𝑵𝜓𝜓�+  
𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 2𝜌𝜌 �𝑵𝑵𝜓𝜓�+   
𝑇𝑇 = �𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿 𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿� + 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� � + 𝜏𝜏𝑁𝑁   
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
Daganzo (1984a) and Robuste et al (1990) demonstrated that the former formulas are good distance 
approximations when N>>C.  If C=N, the local areas can not be built towards the depot since they are 
not long and narrow. In these cases, one vehicle is able to visit all points, and, as in the former references, 
the depot is located at the center of service area, the line haul distance estimation (term 2𝜌𝜌) is not correct. 
In fact, the former contributions justify that Equations (4) - (5) are only valid when 7 < C < l.5(N/C). 
When the second inequality is not satisfied, the line haul distance of Equation (5) should be replaced by 
𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = (0.4𝑁𝑁/𝐶𝐶 2)(𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁)1/2 for circular zones and depot located at the center. However, in our paper this 
latter assumption is not valid. We consider that the depot will be never located at the center of the city 
area since it is deployed in the surroundings of the city far away from the delivering zones (𝜌𝜌 > √𝐴𝐴). 
Therefore, for N≈C, the line-haul distance component cannot be neglected and its numerical value will 
be, at least similar or, higher than local distance. In those cases, the validity of the line-haul distance 
estimation is justified. The other term under analysis, the local distance estimation (√𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁), is a good 
approximation in compact areas even if N is a low number. Daganzo (1984b) justified that, when N=2 
receivers, the deviation between the modeled distance and the real one is within 0.02√𝐴𝐴 in rounded or 
squared zones.  
D
ρ
2w
P
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3.2. Several carriers 
The formulas derived above for a single carrier delivering parcels to a set of N receivers are now used to 
compare two alternative logistic scenarios: (A) independent carriers performing last-mile delivery in a 
regular distribution, and (B) a last-mile delivery system with collaboration among carriers and freight 
consolidation through a Consolidation Facility (UCC or uSA). 
 
The following assumptions and the ones presented in Section 3.1 apply to the methodological approach to 
be developed:  
• Now, we consider that the distribution service is performed by M different carriers. We assume 
that each carrier i=1,..,M  gives service to a subset of Ni customers, with 𝑁𝑁 = ∑ 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1,.,𝑀𝑀 . Indeed, 
the variable ϕ𝑖𝑖 = 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖/𝑁𝑁 denotes the market share of each carrier i (i=1,..,M) considering the 
total distribution of parcels in the area of service. The market share can be different among 
carriers.  Therefore, the customer density of each company is denoted by 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 = 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖/𝐴𝐴, i = 1,..,M. 
Note that 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 is smaller than the overall demand density in the region δ= N/A. The parcel volume 
distribution F(y) is considered to be the same for all carriers involved.  
• The consolidation facility is located inside the delivering area, at a distance 𝜑𝜑 = 𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥 + 𝜑𝜑𝑦𝑦  from 
the center of the service region (0 ≤ 𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥 ≤ 𝑙𝑙𝑥𝑥/2, 0 ≤ 𝜑𝜑𝑦𝑦 ≤ 𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦/2).  
• Carriers still use vehicles with the same capacity in the line-haul distribution (from distribution 
center to the urban consolidation facility). However, the CF operator may use bigger or smaller 
vehicles in the last mile distribution network with regard to the carrier’s fleet. Indeed, we 
consider the capacity of those vehicles used by CF operator in the last mile network to be CCF  = 
k CC, where k c  ∈ ℝ+. Although the parcel consolidation at urban facilities would allow the usage 
of bigger vehicles (k C  ≥1) in the local distribution, the number of routes can be constrained by 
the available time horizon rather than capacity restriction. In fact, CF operator may choose 
vehicles of smaller capacity (k C  ≤1) that will fit better the vehicle size regulations of the city and 
the physical layout of existing streets. These vehicles may show lesser detour distance in each 
tour.  
• The maximal parcel volume of a receiver u max  (u max≤ymax) that is accepted to be delivered with 
the vehicles operated by CF operator is assumed to be u max  (u max≤ymax). We suppose that all 
parcels with y≤umax  will be routed through the consolidation facility and transshipped to the 
vehicles of CCF  capacity (strategy B). Now, we refer the volume of each parcel k  to be routed 
through the consolidation facility as u k  (0≤u k≤umax). Therefore, this u max  constitutes a decision 
variable that plays a key role in the CF operator profitability. The definition of u max should be 
done by CF operator jointly with the selection of the nominal capacity of vehicles CCF , taking 
into account the distribution of parcel volumes F(y). Therefore, the total number of deliveries to 
be captured by the consolidation service from a single carrier i (i=1,..,M) will be estimated by 
Ni F(u max). Under these circumstances, the expected value of the parcel volume of a single 
receiver served by the CF operator’s vehicles will be 𝐸𝐸(𝑢𝑢) = ∫ 𝑢𝑢𝑦𝑦(𝑢𝑢)𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚0 . On the contrary, 
each carrier will serve with the regular distribution network a total amount of Ni (1-F(u max)) 
receivers whose parcel volume are y>u max  (like strategy A). 
• It is assumed that each carrier i (i=1,..,M) has to pay a fare 𝜃𝜃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ,𝑖𝑖(𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘) to the CF operator for each 
parcel to be distributed through the CF. This fare may depend on the parcel volume 𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘 (0 ≤
𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘 ≤ 𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥) in real agreements between CF operator and carriers, presenting an increasing 
function with regard to the parcel volume. For example, 𝜃𝜃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ,𝑖𝑖(𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘) = 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 + 𝜃𝜃�𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘, where 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 , 𝜃𝜃� 
are positive constants. However, for the sake of simplicity, we formulated the necessary 
conditions considering the equivalent flat fare 𝜃𝜃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = �∑ ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝑖𝑖(𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘)𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘=1𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖=1 ��𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶 (𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚)�   regardless parcel 
volume.  
  
Strategies A and B will be compared in terms of transportation costs, the externalities caused by the 
distribution system to the citizens and the net benefit of the CF operator (only for strategy B). Throughout 
the paper, the superscripts A, B, CF, R refer to the estimation of variables or parameters for independent 
carriers (strategy A), collaborating carriers through a consolidation facility (strategy B), the CF operator 
and those parcels of regular carriers not routed through the consolidation facility, respectively. It is 
assumed that all the carriers try to minimize their costs.  
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Figure 3. a) Scheme of regular distribution  in Strategy A and b) carriers’ distribution through 
consolidation facility in Strategy B.   
3.2.1. Strategy A. Independent deliveries 
As mentioned before, in the regular distribution, each carrier is responsible for visiting its corresponding 
receivers independently with its own fleet. The total cost of the M carriers (𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴) in strategy A is the sum of 
the costs of each individual carrier (ZC,i ) presented in Section 3.1 (see Equation 7). Moreover, the cost of 
the emissions produced by the whole freight fleet (𝑍𝑍𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 ) is addressed in Equation (8). Let E be the 
different types of pollutants under analysis; 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗 (𝑆𝑆) the emission factor of pollutant j corresponding to the 
vehicle used by carriers (amount of pollutant j /unit of distance) and the cruising speed of vehicle v; and $𝑗𝑗  the monetary cost of the impact of an amount of pollutant j on the society and the environment. 
Therefore, the total cost of the emissions caused by each kilometer run by a carrier vehicle at speed v is 
estimated by 𝜀𝜀(𝑆𝑆) = ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗 (𝑆𝑆)$𝑗𝑗𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗=1 .This approach is consistent to the methodology presented in EMEP-
EEA (2013).  
 
The estimation of the local and line-haul distance presented in Equations (9)-(10) depends on the relative 
market share of each specific carrier i, 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖 (i=1,..M) and the maximal number of receivers that one vehicle 
can serve in one tour, 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 � 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸 (𝑦𝑦) ; 𝐿𝐿−𝛽𝛽/𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿2𝛿𝛿
𝑖𝑖
−1/2
√3𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿
+𝜏𝜏
�.  Here, the time horizon H has been considered as the 
maximal time period in which regular carrier’s vehicles are allowed to run within the city boundary. 
Therefore, we do not consider the running time in the line-haul distance (term 2ρ/vLH  in the estimation of 
𝜓𝜓) since this operation can happen outside the temporal restriction H. Note that in the estimation of local 
and line-haul distance, the number of tours are defined by �
𝑁𝑁ϕ𝑖𝑖
𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝐴 �
+
, where [𝑥𝑥]+ is a mathematical operator 
that gives the lowest integer value greater than or equal to  x. 
𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶
𝐴𝐴 = �𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶,𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖 =1
= ��𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑 �𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿 ,𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 + 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 �+ 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴�𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖 =1
 
(7) 
𝑍𝑍𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴 = ��𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿 ,𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 𝜀𝜀(𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿) + 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ,𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 𝜀𝜀(𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)�𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖 =1
 
(8) 
𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿
𝐴𝐴 = �𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿,𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚=1 = 2√3 (𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁)1/2�ϕ𝑖𝑖1/2𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚=1 + 𝛽𝛽� �𝑁𝑁ϕ𝑖𝑖𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 �
+𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚=1  
𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐴𝐴 = �𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚=1 = 2�𝜌𝜌𝑚𝑚 �𝑁𝑁ϕ𝑚𝑚𝜓𝜓𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴 �
+𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚=1  
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 = �𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿� +𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� �+ 𝜏𝜏𝑁𝑁 
(9) 
 
(10) 
 
(11) 
3.2.2. Strategy B. Collaboration through a consolidation facility.  
CF
D1
D2ϕx
ϕy
(1)
(2)
(3) (4) (5)
(6)
(7)(8)
(9)
D1
ly
D2
lx
ly
lx(a) (b)
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The total transportation costs are divided into three distribution components: the costs that traditional 
carriers undergo to distribute goods to the consolidation facility (𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵, Equation 12), the costs of the CF 
operator for last-mile distribution (ZCF , Equation 13) and the cost incurred by carriers in a regular 
distribution to perform these deliveries (𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅, Equation 14). The term 𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵 includes: the transportation cost 
associated to the link distribution center-CF covered with regular carrier vehicles (𝑍𝑍𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵 ), and the price that 
the carriers pay to the CF operator for using the CF (𝑍𝑍𝜃𝜃
𝐵𝐵). The vehicles deployed in the line-haul link will 
carry all parcels of each company to be distributed in the area.  
 
The cost analysis for the CF operator considers the cost concerning the distance covered, the travel time 
and a new term Ω  that captures the investment cost to build and maintain the consolidation facility itself 
(see Equation 13). Parameter Ω  is expressed in monetary units per unit of service time. Since the 
consolidation facility is not conceived to be a storage warehouse and parcels are shipped on the same day, 
the inventory cost of parcels is neglected. We assume that the cruising speed of the fleet used by CF 
operator is equal to vL . Although the distribution of CF vehicles is performed within the area of service, 
we also consider a line-haul distance in this area due to the non-centralized location of the facility. Due to 
the potential lowest vehicle dimensions and city access restrictions, we consider that this fleet performs 
fewer detours in comparison to conventional vehicles used by regular carriers. Therefore, the 
corresponding detour distance for CF fleet is assumed to be βCF≤β. In addition to that, those 
environmental-friendly vehicles may be exempted to obey the temporal access restriction imposed by 
local governments in local distribution. Therefore, the maximum distribution time horizon for CF 
operator’s vehicles is supposed to be HCF (HCF≥H). Here, we have also supposed specific unit cost (𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 , 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶), emissions factors 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (𝑆𝑆) and the monetization of all emission per veh-km 𝜀𝜀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑆𝑆) =
∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑆𝑆) $𝑗𝑗𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗=1 , as fleets can be adapted to the urban environment.  
 
The transportation cost incurred by carriers to perform regular deliveries (without unloading them at the 
consolidation facility) is addressed in Equation (14), with the same assumptions considered in Strategy A. 
We assume that these tours can be performed with the same vehicles feeding the consolidation facility. 
Finally, Equation (15) takes into account the total cost of emissions to be considered in Strategy B. 
 
 
𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶
𝐵𝐵 = �𝑍𝑍𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖 =1
+ �𝑍𝑍𝜃𝜃,𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖 =1
= ��𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ,𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 + 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵� 𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖 =1
+ �  𝜃𝜃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖 =1
𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥) (12) 
𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = �𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) + 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈�+ Ω  (13) 
𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶
𝑅𝑅 = �𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶,𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖 =1
= ��𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑 �𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 + 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿 ,𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 � + 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅� 𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖 =1
 
 
(14) 
𝑍𝑍𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
𝐵𝐵 = ��(𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ,𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 + 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ,𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 )𝜀𝜀(𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) + (𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝜀𝜀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿) + 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿 ,𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 𝜀𝜀(𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿)�𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖 =1
 
 
(15) 
 
As we consider that the consolidation facility is located 𝜑𝜑 = 𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥 + 𝜑𝜑𝑦𝑦  away from the center of the 
distributing area, we assume that carriers will run an extra line-haul distance ∆𝜌𝜌. This variable ∆𝜌𝜌 may 
depend on the location of the carrier’s distribution center outside the delivering area and consequently on 
the boundary of the distribution area through which the vehicles enter. Therefore, we divide the boundary 
of the region of service into eight segments of different length l r  (r=1,..,8) to compute the average ∆𝜌𝜌.  In 
Figure 3b the partition of the boundary of service area is plotted. The variable ∆𝜌𝜌 may be estimated as the 
sum, for each segment of length l r , of the product of the average incremental distance (∆𝜌𝜌Rr) and the 
probability p r  of entering through the segment r ( 𝑚𝑚. 𝑒𝑒. ∆𝜌𝜌 = ∑ ∆𝜌𝜌𝑟𝑟 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟)𝑟𝑟  . As an example, the estimations 
of the corresponding values for segment r=3 are ∆𝜌𝜌R3  =(𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥- 𝜑𝜑𝑦𝑦) and p 3 = 
𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦
2
−𝜑𝜑𝑦𝑦+
𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚
2
2(𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚+𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦) . With some algebra, the 
estimation of the average extra line-haul distance is ∆𝜌𝜌 = �𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥2 + 𝜑𝜑𝑦𝑦2�/(𝑙𝑙𝑥𝑥 + 𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦).  
 
The total distance in the line-haul distribution and the total travel time incurred by all carriers visiting the 
consolidation facility are estimated through Equations (16)-(17).  In that case, the number of receivers 
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that one carrier’s vehicle tour is able to serve is estimated by 𝜓𝜓𝐵𝐵 = � 𝐶𝐶
𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦)�. As vehicles do not perform 
local deliveries, we have only to satisfy �𝐿𝐿 − 2 ∆𝜌𝜌
𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
− 𝜏𝜏′� ≥ 0. In this constraint, we only subtract the 
amount of transport activities time spent inside the city. If this constraint is not guaranteed, there is not 
enough time to perform the line-haul distribution from the distribution center to the consolidation facility.  
 
In Equation (17), we consider that each vehicle spends a total time τ‘ due to the unloading operations of 
all parcels to be routed through CF.  Although 𝜏𝜏′ > 𝜏𝜏, the total time of unloading operations is less when 
carriers drop all freight at the consolidation facility, i.e. 𝜏𝜏′𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥 )𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦)/𝐶𝐶 ≪ 𝜏𝜏𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥 ). On the other 
hand, the corresponding estimations of these variables for the vehicles of the CF operator are presented in 
Equations (18)-(20). Here, the local distance formula is affected by a detour extra distance βCF. For CF 
operator’s fleet, we also take into account an average line-haul distance 𝜌𝜌𝑢𝑢  1 1 Tdue to the decentered location 
of consolidation facility with regard to the center of the distribution area. In Figure 3b we divide the 
service region into nine subregions of area a q  (q=1,..,9).  
The variable 𝜌𝜌𝑢𝑢  is computed as the product of the average distance between the consolidation location 
and the central point of each subregion q, and, the probability that the local distance tour will be 
performed at subregion q ( 𝑚𝑚 . 𝑒𝑒. 𝜌𝜌𝑢𝑢 = ∑ 𝜌𝜌𝑢𝑢 ,𝑞𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞)𝑞𝑞 .  For subregion q=3, the expected value of line-haul 
distance is 𝜌𝜌𝑢𝑢 ,3 = �𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥 + 𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚4 + �𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦2 − 𝜑𝜑𝑦𝑦�1/2� and the corresponding probability is 𝑝𝑝3 = 1𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦 �𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚2 ·
�
𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦
2
− 𝜑𝜑𝑦𝑦��. Considering the 9 subregions involved, 𝜌𝜌𝑢𝑢 = �𝑙𝑙𝑥𝑥 + 𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦�/4 + �𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥2𝑙𝑙𝑥𝑥 + 𝜑𝜑𝑦𝑦2𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦�/𝑙𝑙𝑥𝑥𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦. In addition 
to this, the number of receivers visited in each tour is now compute by 
𝜓𝜓𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 � 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶
𝐸𝐸(𝑢𝑢 ) ; �𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶−∆𝜌𝜌𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿−𝜏𝜏′�−2𝜌𝜌𝑢𝑢𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿 −𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶/𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿2(𝛿𝛿𝐶𝐶(𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚))−1/2
√3𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿
+𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
�.  
We consider that the time horizon available for the local distribution performed by CF operator’s fleet is 
affected by the time consumed by regular carriers in the link just between the distribution center - CF and 
the unloading operation time. This assumption allows a proper comparison of strategy A and B in the 
same time period H and it takes into account the transshipment operations at the consolidation facility. 
Finally, the line-haul distance, local distance and travel time of regular distribution of carriers to perform 
those shipments, whose volume is y>u max , is addressed in Equations (21)-(23) respectively. Note that the 
number of tours in regular distribution is estimated by 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 � 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦∗) ; 𝐿𝐿−2∆𝜌𝜌 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 −𝜏𝜏′−2𝜌𝜌𝑢𝑢𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿 − 𝛽𝛽𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿2�𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖(1−𝐶𝐶(𝑢𝑢max )�)−1/2
√3𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿
+𝜏𝜏
� , where 
𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦∗ ) = ∫ 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦(𝑦𝑦)𝑑𝑑𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 . The line-haul distance covered by regular carriers for those parcels that will not 
be unloaded at CF was already included in the term 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵  of Equation (16). However, if the number of 
tours of each carrier i arriving at CF, �𝑁𝑁ϕ𝑖𝑖
𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖
𝐵𝐵 �
+ ,  is not sufficient to visit the corresponding 𝑁𝑁ϕ𝑖𝑖(1-F(u max)) 
receivers in a regular service, this carrier would have to dispatch more vehicles from the distribution 
center. The extra vehicles are estimated by the term ∆𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖  in Equation (21). This situation can only happen 
when the time horizon H for regular carrier is significantly constrained. 
𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐵𝐵 = �𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ,𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖 =1
= � 2(𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 + ∆𝜌𝜌) �𝑁𝑁ϕ𝑖𝑖𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 �+𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 =1  
𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 = �𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1
= �𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵
𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
� + 𝜏𝜏′� �𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥 )ϕ𝑖𝑖
𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖
𝐵𝐵 �
+𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖 =1
 
𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 2
√3 (𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥 ))1/2 + 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 �𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥 )𝜓𝜓𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 �+ 
(16) 
 
(17) 
 
(18) 
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𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 2𝜌𝜌𝑢𝑢 �𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥)𝜓𝜓𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 �+ 
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿
+ 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿
+ 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥) 
𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝑅𝑅 = �𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1
= 2��∆𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 (𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 + ∆𝜌𝜌)𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1
� 
                                            Where  
∆𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥 �0; �𝑁𝑁(1 − 𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥))ϕ𝑖𝑖𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 �+ − �𝑁𝑁ϕ𝑖𝑖𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 �+� 
𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿
𝑅𝑅 = �𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿 ,𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖 =1
= 2
√3 (𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁(1 − 𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥)))1/2�ϕ𝑖𝑖1/2𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖=1 + (𝛽𝛽 + 2𝜌𝜌𝑢𝑢 )��𝑁𝑁�1 − 𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥)�ϕ𝑖𝑖𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 �+𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 =1  
𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 = 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅
𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿
+ 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅
𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
+ 𝜏𝜏𝑁𝑁(1 − 𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥 )) 
 
(19) 
 
(20) 
 
(21) 
 
 
 
(22) 
 
(23) 
4. Profitability Analysis 
In this section, the necessary conditions to ensure the profitability of the distribution through a 
Consolidation Facility (CF) are addressed for each stakeholder involved. To do this, we compare the cost 
components provided for the distribution system with a consolidation strategy (referred as a strategy B) to 
the corresponding terms derived for the regular distribution without the provision of a CF (referred as 
strategy A). In the following analysis, let 𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐 ,𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴  , 𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐 ,𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵  and 𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  be the gross revenues of carrier i in 
operational strategy A, the gross revenues of carrier i in strategy B and the gross revenues of CF operator, 
respectively. We used the same approach provided in Holguín-Veras (2008) when defining the necessary 
conditions for guarantying the efficiency of off-hour deliveries.  
The first condition is to guarantee that the society receives benefits from the consolidated system, i.e. that 
the total logistic cost of the system and the externalities caused are reduced when carriers use the CF 
service. Equation (24) defines the variable Δ1 as the sum of the benefits of all carriers in the strategy B 
minus the corresponding benefits in strategy A, the benefits of CF operator and the variation of the 
emissions’ monetization. The latter is calculated as the amount of emissions saved in one day in Strategy 
B with regard to Strategy B (kg/day), multiplied by the corresponding monetary value of one unit of 
pollutant. Variable Δ1 should be positive in order to ensure the efficiency of the collaboration of carriers 
from a system perspective. We assume that the carriers’ revenues are maintained when they switch to the 
operation mode B (i.e.  𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐 ,𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 = 𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐 ,𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 ), hence, receivers or suppliers will maintain the same fare θ c in 
strategy A and B. On the other hand, we assume that the revenues of the CF operator come from the fare 
paid by those carriers using the consolidation facility and possibly other sources such as publicity or 
subsidies. The fares that carriers pay to the CF operator are not relevant in this case. Since they appear in 
both, CF operator gross revenues and carrier cost, they are cancelled. They are part of the cash flows 
among stakeholders. However, this constraint do not represent that each stakeholder is benefitted by the 
consolidation strategy implementation.   
Δ1 = � �𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐 ,𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 − 𝑍𝑍𝑐𝑐,𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 − 𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶,𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 �𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖 =1
−��𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐 ,𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 − 𝑍𝑍𝑐𝑐,𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 �𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1
� + �𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 −𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶� + (𝑍𝑍𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 − 𝑍𝑍𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 ) ≥ 0 (24) 
For this reason, the second condition to be fulfilled is to obtain a positive benefit of each carrier i 
(i=1,..,M) involved in the new distribution system through the consolidation facility. In Equation (25), the 
variable Δ2𝑖𝑖  should be positive in order to ensure that those transportation cost savings of carrier i are 
greater than the total fares to be paid to the CF operator. The fare paid by carriers is included in the term 
𝑍𝑍𝑐𝑐,𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 . 
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Δ2𝑖𝑖 = �𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐 ,𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 − 𝑍𝑍𝑐𝑐,𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 − 𝑍𝑍𝑐𝑐,𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 � − �𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐 ,𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 − 𝑍𝑍𝑐𝑐,𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 �    ≥ 0               ∀𝑚𝑚 (25) 
The conservative values of site-dependent parameters that satisfy the carrier profitability Δ2𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0 are 
constrained by Equation (26). The factors 𝐴𝐴2 ,𝑖𝑖, 𝐵𝐵2 ,𝑖𝑖 and 𝐶𝐶2,𝑖𝑖 are functions that depend on the demand of 
retailers (N), the market share among carriers (ϕ𝑖𝑖) and vehicle capacities (𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖). Therefore, once the latter 
terms have been defined, decision makers may prove that the rest of site-dependent parameters (vehicle 
unit cost, speeds, length between distribution centers and city center, stopping times and CF operation 
fare) satisfy Equation (26). The factors 𝐴𝐴2 ,𝑖𝑖, 𝐵𝐵2 ,𝑖𝑖 and 𝐶𝐶2,𝑖𝑖 are developed from Equations (7)-(23). They 
only capture distance and demand-related variables. Two vehicles with the same volumetric capacity may 
present different unit cost depending on the implementation instance. In fact, the distance- related unit 
cost parameter 𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑 is different in fully- electric and combustion engine powered vehicles. In the latter, the 
consumer price of fuel products may differ in each country, depending on the fuel taxes or even 
government subsidies. The time-dependent cost also varies among sites according to the average driver 
salaries and vehicle renting/purchasing price.  
It is interesting to identify the domains of Ni  and F(u max) corresponding to values of factors 𝐴𝐴2 ,𝑖𝑖, 𝐵𝐵2,𝑖𝑖  and 
𝐶𝐶2,𝑖𝑖 that will ever (or never) satisfy Equation (26), whatever the site-dependent parameters will be. This 
analysis is provided in Section 5.1. 
�𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑 + 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿 � 𝐴𝐴2 ,𝑖𝑖 + 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 �𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑 + 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� 𝐵𝐵2 ,𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝐶𝐶2,𝑖𝑖 −  𝜃𝜃 ≥ 0                ∀𝑚𝑚 (26) 
Where 
𝐴𝐴2,𝑖𝑖 = 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿,𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 − 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿,𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅
𝑁𝑁ϕ𝑖𝑖 𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥)= � 2
√3 �𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁ϕ𝑖𝑖 �12�1 −�1 − 𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥)�12� +𝛽𝛽 �𝑁𝑁ϕ𝑖𝑖𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 �+− (𝛽𝛽 + 2𝜌𝜌𝑢𝑢) �𝑁𝑁�1− 𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥)�ϕ𝑖𝑖𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 �+�/�𝑁𝑁ϕ𝑖𝑖 𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥)� 
𝐵𝐵2,𝑖𝑖 = 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 − 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 − 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅
𝑁𝑁ϕ𝑖𝑖 𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥) = �2�𝑁𝑁ϕ𝑖𝑖𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 �+ − 2 �𝑁𝑁ϕ𝑖𝑖𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 �+− 2∆𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 − 2 ∆𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌𝑚𝑚 �𝑁𝑁ϕ𝑖𝑖𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 �+− 2∆𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 ∆𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌𝑚𝑚 � /�𝑁𝑁ϕ𝑖𝑖 𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥)� 
𝐶𝐶2,𝑖𝑖 = �𝑁𝑁ϕ𝑖𝑖 𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥) − ?̅?𝜏𝜏𝜏�𝑁𝑁ϕ𝑖𝑖 𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥)𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 �+�/�𝑁𝑁ϕ𝑖𝑖 𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥)� 
The third necessary condition is aimed at guaranteeing the net profitability of CF operator, i.e. that the 
gross revenues of the CF operator cover its costs (𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ≥ 0). In Equation (27) the variable Δ3 
accounts for the benefits to run the consolidation service and the last mile distribution to the final 
receivers. It takes into account the corresponding costs of the operation as well as the investment cost 
associated to the implementation of a CF. Here, a given fare per parcel is charged to each carrier i=1,..,M, 
that constitutes the major incomes of the CF operator. However, we also consider the term S CF  that 
captures all potential incomes per day coming from other sources than pricing. This term may represent 
subsidies paid by local governments or even incomes from advertising and publicity billboards located on 
both vehicles and the consolidation facility.  
Δ3 = ��𝜃𝜃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥)𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1
� + 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) − 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − Ω ≥ 0 (27) 
The corresponding CF operator site –dependent parameters that result in a positive profitability for CF 
operator (Δ3 ≥ 0) must fulfill Equation (28) 
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+(𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − Ω) − �𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿 � 𝐴𝐴3 + �𝜃𝜃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶�𝐵𝐵3 ≥ 0                  (28) 
where 
𝐴𝐴3 = 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 2√3 (𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥))1/2 + 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹�𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥)𝜓𝜓𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 �+ + 2𝜌𝜌𝑢𝑢 �𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥)𝜓𝜓𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 �+; and 𝐵𝐵3 = 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥) 
Finally, the last necessary condition is aimed at obtaining some positive environmental impact savings 
while the consolidation service is run. Although one may consider a wide list of potential externalities 
(noise, congestion, etc.); in this paper we only take into account the effect of GHG and local emissions on 
the environment and human health. Equation (29) defines the monetary value of the amount of emissions 
saved (Δ4) due to the implementation of the consolidation strategy. The monetized emission parameters 
that determine a neutral effect (Δ4 ≥ 0) in terms of emissions savings should satisfy Equation (30)  
Δ4 = (𝑍𝑍𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 − 𝑍𝑍𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 ) ≥ 0 (29) 
+𝑒𝑒 (𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿)�𝐴𝐴4 ,𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖 =1
+ 𝑒𝑒 (𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)�𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵4,𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1
− 𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿)𝐶𝐶4 ≥ 0   
(30) 
where  𝐴𝐴4 ,𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴2 ,𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁ϕ𝑚𝑚 𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥)  𝐵𝐵4,𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵2 ,𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁ϕ𝑚𝑚 𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥); and 𝐶𝐶4 = 𝐴𝐴3   
It can be easily demonstrated with some algebra that if the settings of this consolidation strategy satisfy a 
minimal profitability for all carriers, CF operator and externalities, it also satisfies a positive total system 
profitability (Equation 24).  
 
5. Analysis of results 
In this section, the numerical estimations of the factors involved in Equations (26), (28) and (30) are 
analyzed for any generic distribution instance, in which we only determine the capacity of the vehicles 
used by carriers and CF operator. The distance and temporal-related unit cost of vehicles are not defined 
in advance, since they may vary according to the labor rules and energy cost in each country. The 
available gross vehicle typologies in the market Vc={van, pick-up, light truck, ..} constitute a discrete 
supply, where the volume capacity does not vary significantly for the type of vehicle chosen. These factor 
estimations are provided by retailer density-F(u max) diagrams for a target vehicle capacity.  
Moreover, a profitability analysis of a carrier-led consolidation strategy is addressed by means of 
formulas (24)-(25)-(27)-(29) in a specific problem instance. All input parameters related to the retailer 
demand and competition among carrier companies have been theoretically proposed. However, the site-
dependent parameters (unit cost of vehicles, speeds, etc.) involved in Equations (26), (28), (30) have been 
defined resembling the current freight market situation in Barcelona city.  
 
5.1. Profitability analysis for a general instance 
In Appendix A2, the corresponding estimations for factors A2,i , B2,i , C2,i  involved in Equation (26) for 
assessing carrier profitability are plotted in a (δi ,F(u max)) diagram. The former factors are specific for the 
market share (δi =N ϕ i ) of each carrier i (i=1,..,M) in the region of service and the vehicle capacity used. 
Here, we only developed the aforementioned estimations for volumetric capacities C=9m3 (representing 
small trucks, in Figures A1.a-A3.a) and C=4.2m3 (representing a commercial van, Figures A1.b-A3.b). 
The assumptions considered in the development of these estimations are the ones developed in Section 
3.1-3.2 and the following: 
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• In the expression of factor C2,i , we conservatively assume a constant ratio 
𝜏𝜏�
𝜏𝜏
= 5. It represents the 
upper bound for the term  𝜏𝜏�
𝜏𝜏
 evaluated in a UCC pilot test conducted in Barcelona in 2013 
(Navarro et al. 2016).  
• A similar assumption has been defined for the term ∆𝜌𝜌
𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖
. We suppose that the additional detour 
distance covered by carriers in order to visit the CF operator is always less than the 10% of the 
total distance between city center and the location of carrier’s headquarters. Here, we continue 
considering that distributions centers are always located out of the city.  Therefore, the 
expression of B2,i  was conservatively obtained for 
∆𝜌𝜌
𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖
=0.10.  
• The other input parameters considered in the estimation of the aforementioned factors are 
𝛽𝛽 = 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 0.10km, 𝜌𝜌𝑢𝑢 =2.83km, ymax=0.3 m3 and E(y)=0.15m3. In this subsection, we assume 
that the number of receivers that each vehicle is able to visit is not constrained by the temporal 
restrictions of the distribution system.  
In order to satisfy Equation (26) for carrier i, one or many of the A2,i -B2,i -C2,i  terms should be positive. 
However, there is a domain of (δi ,F(u max)) pairs that produce negative values for all three factors. In fact, 
B2,i  term is always negative while the 50% of the analyzed (δi ,F(u max)) domain produces negative values 
for the A2,i  term. The C2,i  is the term that presents the smallest area of negative values in the domain of 
analysis. Interestingly, we identify a non-profit region of (δi ,F(u max)) pairs for carrier i. It is equivalent to 
the (δi ,F(u max)) domain providing negative values for factor C2,i , plotted in Figure A.3a and A.3b in 
Appendix 2. This domain of (δi ,F(u max)) variables always causes negative profit for carrier i for any 
combination of cost coefficients cd ,c t ,τ  and θCF . This domain is identified for extremely low values of 
F(u max) as well as low values of density of receivers served by this carrier i (δi ). In fact, the negative 
domain of ∆2  is always obtained when δi ·F(u max)<0.625 for C=9m3 and C=4.2m3. However, this 
boundary only represents a lower bound of the non-profit domain. Obviously, we can also obtain 
unfeasible situations for C2,i >0 (out of the former boundaries), especially when the fare θCF   is a large 
number.  
The values for factors A3 -B3  of Equation (28) are plotted in a (δ,F(u max)) diagram. In Appendix A2, we 
show the corresponding diagrams for CF operator vehicle capacity CCF =2.16 m3 (Figure A4.a and A5.a, 
representing a van) and CCF  =1.2m3 (Figures A4.b and A5.b, representing electric cargo bikes). In these 
cases, we plot the total density of receivers served by all carriers in the vertical axis. With some algebra 
and considering 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶=𝜌𝜌𝑢𝑢��� = 0, a lower bound of the carrier fare  θCF  that justifies the profitability for CF 
operator is defined in Equation (31).   
𝜃𝜃 ≥ �𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + �𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿 � 2�3𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖�  + (Ω − 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝐵𝐵3                𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒   𝐵𝐵3 = 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹(𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥)  (31) 
Finally, the analytical expressions of term  A4,i -B4,i -C4,i  in Equation (30) depend on (δi,F(u max)) pairs and 
they are quite similar to the former factors determined before (A2,i -B,2i -A3 ). Therefore, we do not exhibit 
the corresponding diagrams. From the analysis of B4,i  and C4,i  factors, we can state that B4,i  <0 and        
C4,i  >0.  Therefore, if the monetized emissions factors of vehicles (𝑒𝑒(𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)  and 𝑒𝑒(𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿)) are greater 
than 0, the only condition that may satisfy Equation (30) is that ∑ 𝐴𝐴4 ,𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖=1 >0, i.e. ∑ 𝐴𝐴2,𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖=1 >0.  Therefore, 
the domain of (δi ,F(u max)) providing negative values for ∑ 𝐴𝐴2,𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖=1  can not be considered feasible for 
environmental purposes. However, depending on the market share of each carrier taking part in the 
initiative, the corresponding values of 𝐴𝐴2 ,𝑖𝑖 may take positive or negative results. From the diagrams 
plotted for 𝐴𝐴2 ,𝑖𝑖 factor in Appendix 2 (Figures A1.a, .b), we can ensure that 𝐴𝐴2 ,𝑖𝑖 < 0  ,∀𝑚𝑚 , when the 
percentage of parcels routed through CF is less than a critical F*(u max) value. This critical value is 
F*(u max)=0.36 when the carrier vehicle capacity is C=9m3, and F*(u max)=0.49 for C=4.2m3. The former 
conditions represent a conservative lower bound of F*(u max), that is, the domain F(u max) ≤F*(u max) 
worsens the emissions economic impact of consolidation strategy with regard to Strategy A. Obviously, 
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depending on 𝑒𝑒(𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿), 𝑒𝑒(𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿), and 𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿) values, the consolidation strategy can not be still justified from 
environmental perspective when  F(u max)> F*(u max). 
5.2. Profitability analysis for a test instance 
An ideal problem has been proposed in order to quantify the potential effects of consolidation initiatives 
on stakeholders involved and verify the application of general necessary conditions in a specific case. 
This problem is defined by a set of input parameters summarized in Appendix 1. It has three variants 
representing particular implementations. In all of them, we consider that there are 1,000 receivers 
scattered in a rectangular area A=3·2 km2, i.e. the receiver density is δ=166.6 rec/km2. The parcel volume 
ordered by each receiver is uniformly distributed in the domain (0; 0.3] m3. The upper bound is defined 
considering the maximal allowable packaging from a real carrier (express pallet dimensions from DHL, 
2013). However, we consider that only those parcels whose volume is less than u max=0.24 m3 (i.e. 
F(u max)=0.8) can be routed through the consolidation facility. Both δ and F(u max) are crucial parameters 
that have been defined at significant values in their viable domain. In order to compare both strategies 
under the same conditions of operation, stop times and vehicle detours have been considered to be 
identical for regular carrier and CF operator’s fleet. We take into account that parcel services in the area 
under study are provided by M=10 different carriers companies with the following market share:  ϕ1 =0.2; 
ϕ2 = ϕ3 =0.05 and ϕ i =0.1, (i=4,..,10). We consider that all carriers present a distribution center located at 
ρ=20km away from the urban distribution area. Regular carriers are supposed to deliver goods to 
receivers with vehicles whose capacity is C=9m3. These input parameters have been considered according 
to a UCC pilot test conducted in Barcelona in 2014 (SMILE, 2015). This ρ parameter is the mean 
distance value between the gravity center of the delivering area and the distribution centers of 6 main 
third party logistics that took part in the pilot test. All distribution centers were located out of the urban 
layout of Barcelona. The corresponding unit distance and temporal cost (ct  and cd ) are chosen according 
to the information gathered from a regional survey to road carriers in Catalonia, Spain (Generalitat de 
Catalunya, 2015). Local and line-haul cruising speed parameters have been defined by usual values 
presented in historical centers of cities like Barcelona, vL=20 km/h and vLH =60 km/h. The consolidation 
facility in all scenarios is supposed to be located 2 kilometers away from the center of distribution area 
(φx=1 km; φy=1 km). The installation of a consolidation facility and all structural cost are expressed by a 
parameter Ω=46 €/h. It is assumed an investment cost of 50.000 euros (infrastructure), a lifetime of 10 
years and a maintenance cost of 12.000 €/year (SMILE, 2015). Moreover, a constant fare of θCF =1 
euros/parcel is assumed to be paid by carriers for each parcel delivered through the consolidation facility. 
For the sake of simplicity, we consider a common fare per parcel for all carriers involved. A constant 
service charge per parcel is commonly adopted in theoretical studies and real implementations (Janjevic 
and Ndiaye, 2016). Moreover, the CF operator fleet has HCF= 8 hours to perform all the deliveries in the 
urban area where the time horizon for regular carriers (H) is variable.  
The specific parameters that generate the three scenarios of this problem are explained below. In Scenario 
1, the CF operator’s fleet consists of fully-electric vans of real capacity k cC=2.16 m3 (k c=0.24). The unit 
distance cost has been estimated considering the energy consumption per km and the average price of the 
electricity (kWh) in Spain.  In this case, we assume that there is no temporal access restriction in the 
urban area for regular carriers (HCF=H=8hours). In that case, the corresponding factors of Equation (26) 
for the carrier with highest market share are A2,1  =0.0894, B2,1 = -0.005 and C2,1 =0.9062, while the 
corresponding to the carrier of lowest market share A2,2  =0.1763 B2,2 = -0.005 and C2,2 =0.8750. The 
corresponding factors involved in Equation (28) are A3 = 351 and B3 =800. Considering the former 
factors, the profitability of both carriers can be ensured in advance by Equation (26) for the given 
consolidation fare, speeds and unit vehicle costs. However, the CF operator profitability is not justified, 
since the inequality of Equation (28) is not satisfied. In addition to that, the corresponding emission 
monetization factors are 𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿)=0 (fully electric vehicles), 𝑒𝑒(𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿) =0.0069 €/veh-km and 
𝑒𝑒(𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) =0.0055 €/veh-km. The corresponding factors of Equation (30) are ∑ 𝐴𝐴4 ,𝑖𝑖 =10𝑖𝑖=1 115 and 
∑ 𝐵𝐵4,𝑖𝑖 =10𝑖𝑖=1 -80, that guarantee the environmental profitability of the consolidation strategy. 
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Scenario 2 considers that the CF operator fleet consists of electric cargo-bikes with real capacity of k cC= 
1.2 m3 (k c=0.133). We still consider no temporal access restrictions for regular carriers, (HCF=H=8 
hours). The new values for the factors involved in Equation (28) are A3 = 558.6 and B3 =800, that result 
in a positive balance of Equation (28) for the new unit distance and temporal costs 𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 0.015 €/veh-km 
and 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 =15.54 €/veh-h. This consideration neither affects the environmental viability nor the regular 
carrier profitability. 
In Scenario 3, we maintain the same CF operator fleet as in Scenario 2. In this case, there is temporal 
access restriction for the regular carrier’s vehicles. Several cities have promoted the implementation of 
these policies in the city center to heavy and light commercial vehicles. In rush commercial periods, 
freight vehicles are not allowed to enter the city center and/or perform load/unload operations. Therefore, 
carriers must perform their deliveries within a specific time window, experiencing higher transportation 
costs. This situation is addressed in this paper considering a narrower time horizon to perform deliveries. 
We assume that H= 2.5 hours. However, this temporal restriction is not considered for CF operator 
vehicles, since electric cargo-bikes are allowed to circulate even along sidewalks and pedestrian priority 
streets. This situation is not previously addressed by Equations (26), (28) and (30), since the factors of 
former Equations are only valid if the route length is not restricted by temporal constrains.  
Finally, a sensitivity analysis is carried out in the three former subscenarios with regard to the key 
parameters that much strongly affect the results: the density of receivers, δ=Ν/Α, and the maximal parcel 
volume threshold that the CF operator is allowed to serve (u max). The terms in brackets in Appendix 1 
represent the parameters domain explored in the sensitivity analysis. Finally, an economic analysis of the 
sustainable domain of the carrier’s fare is addressed in section 5.2.2. 
 
5.2.1. Discussion 
The profitability indicators for this problem are analyzed in this section based on the results of Table 1. In 
the first two Scenarios, the total distance covered by the sum of carriers and CF fleet in Strategy B (1258; 
1412 km) is higher than the distance covered in Strategy A (1079; 1079 km). This increment is due to the 
higher distance covered within the distribution area. The reason is that the vehicle capacity of the CF fleet 
is smaller (𝜓𝜓𝐴𝐴= 60 receivers; 𝜓𝜓𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶=18 receivers in Scenario 1 and 𝜓𝜓𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶=10 receivers in Scenario 2). 
However, in Strategy B the 61-71% of the distance travelled within the city is carried out by electric 
vehicles, causing less local and GHG emissions. In addition to that, the total number of hours of vehicles 
(𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵+ 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 +𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅) in Strategy B is reduced by 10% with regard to Strategy A in Scenario 1. The reason is the 
reduction of the number of stops of the carriers at receivers’ locations (τ). Scenario 1 needs less resources 
and less transport distance to perform all deliveries in comparison to Scenario 2 due to a higher vehicle 
capacity.  
Consolidation strategies do not improve the level of congestion of Scenario 1 and 2, as more kilometers 
are run by the total fleet. In Scenario 2, the distance travelled by CF vehicles (VCF ) does not contribute to 
traffic congestion, since electric cargo-bikes are allowed to run along sidewalks and pedestrian-priority 
streets. However, it may generate several conflicts with pedestrians. Therefore, consolidation strategies 
basically improve the reduction of stop time at the receiver’s location, causing less problems in 
load/unload parking facilities. Nevertheless, when we analyze the total transportation cost of the system 
instead of the distance and time consumed (cost incurred by carriers, CF operator and externalities), 
Strategy B is always more efficient than Strategy A. The transportation cost saving ranges between 8-13% 
regarding Strategy A.  
In Scenario 3, when temporal access restriction to the distribution area is constrained for carriers 
(H=2.5h), the distance covered by the whole fleet as well as the number of resources are now higher than 
Scenarios 1 and 2 in regular conditions (Strategy A). This is a reasonable result consistent with several 
research analyses (Holguín-Veras et al 2013, Quak and Koster, 2009 and Qureshi et al, 2009). Access 
restrictions usually increase the delivery cost of parcels in a city. In this problem, this increment is around 
12.8% (comparison of total cost of Strategy A in scenario 3 with regard to scenario1). However, the 
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consolidation strategy (strategy B) allows a total distance reduction with regard to regular distribution 
(1479 km in Strategy A and 1412 km in Strategy B), as well as the reduction of the total amount of time 
needed (84 h in Strategy A and 78.2 km in Strategy B). Hence, consolidation strategy may contribute to 
alleviate the negative increment of mileage and, therefore, the emissions caused by regular carriers when 
access restriction is activated.  In this scenario, the total cost in Strategy B is reduced by 23% with regard 
to Strategy A. In all three scenarios, the necessary conditions to guarantee social, carrier and CF operator 
profitability are ensured.  
In all three subscenarios, we do not consider any subsidy or external income for the CF operator, 
therefore the total CF operator costs must be balanced by the fare incomes (i.e. 𝑧𝑧𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝑧𝑧𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶′ ≤ 𝜃𝜃) . In fact, if 
we just consider those deliveries served through the consolidation facility (N·F(u max)=800 receivers), the 
unit average cost saving for a collaborative carrier is ∆𝑧𝑧′����  ={1.218; 1.218; 1.556} €/parcel in Scenarios 1, 2 
and 3 respectively.  In these situations, the corresponding CF operator unit costs are 𝑧𝑧𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝑧𝑧𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶′ ={0.998; 
0.867; 0.867} €/parcel.  Therefore, even if carriers pay the proposed fare (θCF =1€/parcel), this situation 
ensures a net benefit for carriers of 0.218; 0.218 and 0.556 €/parcel routed through CF in Scenarios 1, 2 
and 3 respectively. The corresponding benefits for the CF operator are 0.002; 0.133 and 0.133 €/parcel.  
Table 1. Results in Scenarios 
Variables Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Strategy A    
- Local distance, 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿
𝐴𝐴 (km)  278.9 278.9 279.9 
- Line-haul distance, 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴  (km) 800.0 800.0 1200.0 
- Total delivery time , 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴  (h) 77.3 77.3 84.0 
- Total carrier cost, 𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶
𝐴𝐴 (€/day) 2117.3 2117.3 2387.4 
- Total externality cost, 𝑍𝑍𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴  (€/day) 6.3 6.3 8.5 
Total cost of Strategy A,  𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴  (€/day) 2123.6 2123.6 2395.8 
Unit carrier cost per parcel, 𝒛𝒛𝑨𝑨 = 𝒁𝒁𝑨𝑨 /𝑵𝑵 (€/rec) 2.117 2.117 2.387 
Strategy B    
- Line-haul distance for collaboration carriers, 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐵𝐵  (km) 816.0 816.0 816.0 
- Delivery time for collaboration carriers, 𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵(h) 18.4 18.4 18.4 
- Local distance of CF fleet, 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿
𝑈𝑈 (km) 84.2 87.8 87.8 
- Line-haul distance for CF fleet, 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝑈𝑈  (km) 187.5 337.5 337.5 
- Total delivery time for CF fleet, 𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈 (h) 33.6 41.3 41.3 
- Local distance for regular carriers, 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿
𝑅𝑅 (km) 170.7 170.7 170.7 
- Line-haul distance for regular carriers, 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝑅𝑅  (km) 0.0 0.0 0.0 
- Total delivery time for regular carriers, 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 (h) 18.5 18.5 18.5 
- Total transport cost for collaboration carriers, 𝑍𝑍𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝐵𝐵  (€/day) 659.5 659.5 659.5 
- Total fare payment by collaboration carriers, 𝑍𝑍𝜃𝜃
𝐵𝐵 (€/day) 800.0 800.0 800.0 
- Subsidies, SCF (€/day) 0.0 0.0 0.0 
- Total cost for CF operator, 𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (€/day)  798.2 693.6 693.6 
- Total cost for regular carrier distribution, 𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶
𝑅𝑅(€/day) 483.3 483.3 483.3 
- External cost, 𝑍𝑍𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
𝐵𝐵  (€/day) 5.6 5.6 5.6 
Total cost in Strategy B, 𝑍𝑍𝐵𝐵  (€/day, excluding fare)  1946.6 1842.0 1842.0 
Unit carrier cost per parcel, 𝒛𝒛𝑪𝑪 = (𝒁𝒁𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑩𝑩 + 𝒁𝒁𝑪𝑪𝑹𝑹) /𝑵𝑵                           
(€/rec, excluding fare) 1.143 1.143 1.143 
Profitability results of Strategy B vs A    
Net benefits considering all agents, Δ1 (€/day) 177.0 281.6 553.8 
Benefits of the worst carrier, min Δ2𝑖𝑖  (€/day) 10.5 10.5 37.5 
Benefits of the best carrier, max Δ2𝑖𝑖 (€/day) 28.4 28.4 55.4 
Benefits of the CF operator, Δ3 (€/day) 1.8 106.4 106.4 
Environmental savings, Δ4  (€/day) 0.7 0.7 2.9 
Average unit carrier cost saving per parcel,�𝑧𝑧𝚤𝚤
𝐴𝐴��� − 𝑧𝑧𝚤𝚤
𝐵𝐵����, in €/rec 0.975 0.975 1.245 
Average unit carrier cost saving per parcel delivered through CF, ∆𝑧𝑧′���� , 
in €/rec 1.218 1.218 1.556 
Maximal unit carrier cost saving per parcel delivered through CF  1.263 1.263 1.938 
Minimal unit carrier cost saving per parcel delivered through CF  1.177 1.177 1.346 
Unit CF operator cost per parcel delivered through CF, 𝑧𝑧𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, in €/rec 0.998 0.867 0.867 
Unit CF operator expenses per parcel delivered through CF, 𝒛𝒛𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪′, in 
€/rec 
0.998 
 
0.867 
 
0.867 
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5.2.2. Sensitivity analysis with regard to the number of receivers  
One of the major challenges to economically justify a carrier –led consolidation strategy (Strategy B) is 
the existence of a minimal demand for the consolidation facility. Let δCF  be the spatial density of 
receivers that would be served through the consolidation facility, δCF =δ F(u max), where δ=N/A. 
Therefore, a sensitivity analysis of the profitability of each stakeholder involved with regard to receiver 
density and the maximal parcel volume admitted by CF operator is presented in Figures 4-7. Figure 4 
determines the social benefit (∆1 ) corresponding to the input parameters pairs (F(u max); δ). The boundary 
among regions of different benefit corresponds to an isocurve of the benefit function of Equation (24), i.e. 
∆1 =ct.  The corresponding graphics of the benefits of carriers (∆2 ), CF operator (∆3 ) and environment 
(∆4 ) are depicted in Figure 5, 6 and 7 respectively. The discrete nature of the number of routes (integer 
variable) creates several discontinuities in these functions as it can be observed in the former Figures. In 
order to provide a more understandable analysis, we include in Figure 4 the exhibit (a), in which we 
calculate the corresponding economic condition in Scenario 1, considering a perfect continuous domain 
of the number of tours needed by the carriers and the CF operator. We calculate the number of tours 
needed by stakeholder x in Equations (9)-(10), (16)-(19), (21)-(22) by the real number provided by the 
quotient between the number of receivers visited (Nx) and the maximal number of receivers that one 
vehicle would serve in one tour (𝜓𝜓𝑥𝑥 ). We refer to these estimations as the continuous version of the 
problem. Therefore, in Figure 4a, we replace [𝑁𝑁𝑥𝑥/𝜓𝜓𝑥𝑥 ]+ in the former equations by its corresponding real 
number 𝑁𝑁𝑥𝑥/𝜓𝜓𝑥𝑥. 
Figure 4a present an increasing benefit for society in the continuous version of the problem for larger CF 
demand of deliveries δCF , i.e. higher receiver densities (δ) and cumulative distribution F(u max). The 
discrete versions (Figures 4b, c and d) present the same tendency in ∆1  although several discontinuities 
can be identified for given receiver densities. The society benefits in Scenario 2 (Figure 4c) are slightly 
higher than the corresponding value for Scenario 1 (Figure 4b, electric vans).   However, from Figure 4d 
and 5b, it’s realized that the society and carrier profitability in scenario 3 (temporal access restriction) 
significantly outperforms the previous values obtained in scenarios 1-2.  The promotion of a consolidation 
facility can help local authorities reducing the extracost caused by the access restriction policy. 
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Figure 4. ∆1  Isocurves (€/day) in Scenario 1 (a, b), Scenario 2 (c) and Scenario 3 (d). Exhibit (a) represents the 
continuous problem. 
  
Figure 5. ∆2  isocurves  (€/day) for the carrier with lowest profitability in Scenarios 1-2 (a) and Scenario 3 (b). 
The society profitability presents negative domains of ∆1 , that is, the operation in Strategy A will cause 
lesser costs than Strategy B. In the analysis conducted, the required demand to ensure positive carrier 
profitability (∆2 >0) is more restrictive than the corresponding for society. The domain size of  (F(u max);δ) 
pairs where ∆2 >0  depends on the carrier fare. If this fare was increased, a lower positive domain would 
be observed.  
In Figure 5a, with the analysis of point P and Q as an example, we can see that point P, defined by 
(F(u max);δ)=(0.65; 247), presents a carrier profitability of ∆2 =10 €. Point Q, (F(u max);δ)=(0.9;120), also 
corresponds to the isocurve ∆2 =10 €.  However, in Point P we need a higher number of parcels per area 
routed through CF, �𝛿𝛿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶�𝑃𝑃 = 161 rec/km2, to ensure the same profitability of Point Q, �𝛿𝛿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶�𝑄𝑄 = 108 
rec/km2. The reason is that a major fraction of parcels routed through consolidation facility (greater 
F(u max)) implies an increment of the average volume of these parcels. In this comparison, E(u) Q =0.135 
m3 and E(u) P =0.097 m3. These parcels of higher volume are served in Strategy A by regular carriers, 
consuming a significant part of the potential vehicle capacity.  In all scenarios, the maximal carrier cost 
savings correspond to the maximal density of receivers and the maximal value of F(u max). A fact that 
deserves comment is the horizontal discontinuity curves appeared in Figure 5b. These lines correspond to 
values of a critical density of customers (δ∗) in which the integer number of vehicles needed in Strategy 
A or B varies for the worst carrier. This fact causes that the carrier presenting the lowest cost saving is 
different for δ=δ*-ε and δ=δ*+ε (ε→0). This phenomenon is only identified in Scenario 3 when the 
vehicle capacity is highly constrained by H (less 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 , 𝑚𝑚 = 1, . . ,𝑀𝑀) . 
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Figure 6. ∆3 isocurves (€/day)  in Scenario 1 (a) and  Scenarios 2-3 (b).  
If we analyze Figure 6, the profitability of CF operator does not follow the tendency explained for 
carriers. The maximal profitability is achieved for the maximum values of receiver densities studied (δ) 
and medium cumulative distribution (max ∆3 =135.79 for δ=333.3 rec/km2 and F(u max)=0.59 in Scenario 
1).   
We identify two different behaviors of ∆3  boundaries depending on the value of F(u max). For low values 
of F(u max), the ∆3  isocurves correspond approximately to a constant value of the variable δCF  in the 
(F(u max), δ) graphic. However, when F(u max)>0.5, it implies that parcels of higher volumes have to be 
served by CF operator. As parameter 𝜓𝜓𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  is constrained in these situations by the term k cC/E(u) where 
0<u<u max , larger F(u max) implies lower values of 𝜓𝜓𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 . Consequently, more vehicles are needed to serve 
the demand, increasing the cost incurred by CF operator. Finally, the behavior of ∆4 isocurves is analyzed 
in Figure 7. These isocurves are identical in Scenarios 1-and 2 since the CF operator vehicles are 
considered in both cases fully-electric. In those scenarios, if F(u max) is less than 0.42, the consolidation 
strategy always produces a higher monetization of the emission caused. In Scenario 3, the negative effects 
of the access restriction imposed are smoothed by the consolidation strategies. Generally, the positive 
emission savings domain is significantly higher than in the previous scenarios. In fact, the consolidation 
strategy would reduce transport emissions when F(u max)>0.22 and δ>130 receivers/km2.The monetized 
values of the emissions saved are the lowest component of the total social cost expressed in the variable 
∆1 . However, they constitute the most important justification of this measure for the livability of the city.  
  
Figure 7. ∆4 isocurves (€/day)  in Scenarios 1-2 (a) and  Scenario 3 (b).  
5.2.3. Determination of the viable carrier’s fare domain 
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We are now trying to identify the domains of δ and F(u max) in which we can set a fare θCF  >0 that 
guarantees a positive profitability of both carrier and CF operator. Let 
𝜂𝜂𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖 = �𝑍𝑍𝑐𝑐 ,𝑖𝑖∗𝐴𝐴 −𝑍𝑍𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ,𝑖𝑖∗𝐵𝐵 −𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶,𝑖𝑖∗𝑅𝑅 �/(𝑁𝑁𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖∗𝐶𝐶 (𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚)(𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶−𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)/(𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶(𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚)) . This variable is the ratio between the unit carrier cost savings per 
parcel distributed through the consolidation facility, and the unit net expenses of the CF operator. We 
denote i* (i*=1,…M) as the carrier with the lowest cost savings when it changes from Strategy A to B. 
Therefore, this ratio η r  represents whether there is a margin for a carrier to pay any fare that jointly 
ensures ∆2 >0 and ∆3 >0. When this ratio is η r >1, the transportation cost savings incurred by the carrier i* 
are greater than the operating cost to serve the parcels of the CF operator. Hence, the consolidation 
strategy is economically beneficial for both carrier i* and CF operator. In fact, CF operator could 
determine the service fare as  𝜃𝜃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝜂𝜂𝜃𝜃𝑧𝑧𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ′ , where ηθ  (1≤ηθ≤η r ) is the ratio between the CF operator 
fare incomes and the corresponding unit expenses (excluding subsidies). The lower limit 
(ηθ=1) represents a perfect compensation between cost and fare revenues for the CF operator. The upper 
limit (ηθ=η r) determines that carrier with the lowest savings does not have any economic incentive to 
take part in the collaboration strategy since the total amount of transportation cost saving is equal to the 
cash flow paid to the CF operator.  
  
  
Figure 8. 𝜂𝜂𝑟𝑟-ratio for the carrier with the lowest profitability in Scenario 1 (a, b), Scenario 2 (c) and Scenario 3 
(d). Exhibit (a) represents the continuous problem. 
The η r  ratio is evaluated as a function of F(u max) and δ in Figure 8 for the previous scenarios considering 
the input data of Table 1. In Figure 8a (continuous problem version), the isocurves of η r  ratio vary 
smoothly in the whole domain of analysis. On the contrary, in the discrete version of scenarios 1-2, the 
ratio presents discontinuities that determine a different system behavior. Two regions of similar behavior 
are identified, in which the isocurve η r  =1.0 is obtained by a roughly constant value of the density of 
receivers served through CF (δCF ). In Scenario 1, this critical density is δCF *=75 rec/km2 when 0<δ<180 
rec/km2 and δCF * =120 rec/km2 when δ<253 rec/km2. Similar behaviors can be identified for Scenario 2. 
For both scenarios, less than the 50% of the total domain of (F(u max), δ) presents a value η r >1. In 
Scenario 3, the η r  ratio isocurves present the oddest behavior due to the inclusion of the temporal access 
6.7
40.0
73.3
106.7
140.0
173.3
206.7
240.0
273.3
306.7
0.
01
…
0.
06
0.
11
0.
16
0.
21
0.
26
0.
31
0.
36
0.
41
0.
46
0.
51
0.
56
0.
61
0.
66
0.
71
0.
76
0.
81
0.
86
0.
91
0.
96
 
 
 
 
F(umax)
 
(a)
6.7
40.0
73.3
106.7
140.0
173.3
206.7
240.0
273.3
306.7
0.
01
…
0.
06
0.
11
0.
16
0.
21
0.
26
0.
31
0.
36
0.
41
0.
46
0.
51
0.
56
0.
61
0.
66
0.
71
0.
76
0.
81
0.
86
0.
91
0.
96
Density of receivers, δ (N
/km
2)
F(umax)
 
(b)
6.7
40.0
73.3
106.7
140.0
173.3
206.7
240.0
273.3
306.7
0.
01
…
0.
06
0.
11
0.
16
0.
21
0.
26
0.
31
0.
36
0.
41
0.
46
0.
51
0.
56
0.
61
0.
66
0.
71
0.
76
0.
81
0.
86
0.
91
0.
96
 
 
 
 
F(umax)
(c)
6.7
40.0
73.3
106.7
140.0
173.3
206.7
240.0
273.3
306.7
0.
01
…
0.
06
0.
11
0.
16
0.
21
0.
26
0.
31
0.
36
0.
41
0.
46
0.
51
0.
56
0.
61
0.
66
0.
71
0.
76
0.
81
0.
86
0.
91
0.
96
Density of receivers, δ (N
/km
2)
F(umax)
ηr=  2.00
ηr=  2.20
ηr=  1.60
ηr=  2.00
ηr=  1.80
ηr=  1.80
(d)
20 
 
limitation constraint. Here, the domain where this ratio is η r >1 encompasses the 85% of the total area of 
points (F(u max); δ) analyzed. For δ>140 rec/km2 and F(u max)>0.2, the parameter η r   is always higher than 
1 in Scenario 3.  
6. Conclusions 
 
Consolidation strategies can increase the efficiency of freight distribution in urban areas. However, the 
results that can be achieved and the organizational implications of consolidation strategies depend on the 
agent to whom these strategies are addressed. Carrier-led consolidation programs are addressed to those 
stakeholders that may experience logistic cost savings rather than to those that have the power to change 
the supply chain of goods. In fact, the participation of a low number of carriers (selection), each of them 
responsible for a high number of deliveries, may ensure the economic sustainability of the consolidation 
system.  
 
In this paper, we analyze whether the potential cost savings incurred by regular carriers are sufficient to 
pay a fare to the Consolidation Facility (CF) operator, i.e., if the unit carrier cost saving is higher than the 
unit consolidation cost. If this fact is achieved, a win-to-win collaboration can be proposed. For the sake 
of simplicity, we have assumed a constant fare per parcel for all carriers. The effects of this constant fare 
to carriers and CF operator would be the same of linear fares with regard to parcel volumes, given a 
constant parcel volume distribution among receivers. 
 
An analytical model was developed to identify the necessary conditions that guarantee positive benefits 
for society, carriers, CF operators and environment, when implementing a carrier-led consolidation. The 
model estimates the capital cost as well as the transportation cost of all agents involved by means of 
compact formulas for the consolidation and non-consolidation strategies. Given a vehicle capacity, there 
is a lower bound of the domain of receiver densities routed through the CF (served by one carrier) that 
never produces a positive profitability for this carrier (δi  ·F(u max)<0.625 rec/km2). In these situations, the 
consolidation strategy is not recommended. In the perspective of CF operator, a lower bound of the fare 
per parcel to be paid by carriers has been identified. In real implementations, the carrier’s fare must 
always be higher than this lower bound (given by Equation 31) that depends on the unit cost of CF 
operator vehicle, local speed and time per stop. Finally, for environmental purposes, consolidation 
strategies increase the emissions associated to the transport system for F*(u max)< 0.36 when C=9m3 and 
for F*(u max)<0.49 for C=4.2m3. The necessary condition to obtain positive emission savings is the most 
restrictive from the stated above. The former lower bounds prevail regardless the values of input site-
dependent parameters such as time and distance-related unit costs, speeds, location of distribution centers, 
etc.  
 
The formulas provided by the model are dependent on a given list of parameters describing the supply 
chains and two key decision variables: the carrier’s fare and the maximal parcel volume accepted by the 
CF operator. The carrier fare is just a cash flow to be paid among stakeholders and only affects the carrier 
and the CF profitability. The maximal allowable parcel volume has to be fixed according to the parcel 
volume distribution and the capacity of the CF operator’s vehicles. The higher the maximal allowable 
parcel volume in the CF facility is set, the lesser average number of parcels delivered per tour. Therefore, 
if CF operator increases the maximal admitted parcel volume, the corresponding incomes per tour are 
also reduced.     
The profitability for carriers and CF operator can be analyzed by means of the parameter η r , i.e. the 
quotient between the unit carrier savings and the unit CF operator cost (excluding subsidies or other 
incomes). When η r  >1, even if each carrier pays a fare equivalent to the unit cost per parcel of the CF 
operator, its participation in the consolidation strategy is still economically positive.  
In all numerical scenarios in which the analytical model has been tested for a given set of input 
parameters, there is a critical density of receivers served through CF that ensures η r >1. This critical 
density presents different behaviors depending on the relationship among the maximal parcel volume 
accepted by CF operator and the maximal parcel volume in the area.  In spite of this, for a general case of 
21 
 
implementation in which we choose the most restrictive value, the critical density that satisfies the 
condition η r >1 is δCF * =120 rec/km2 for the scenario where the capacity of electric vans is 2.4 m3. When 
CF operator chooses electric cargo-bikes of 1.2 m3 capacity, the condition η r >1 is achieved for critical 
densities of δCF *=93 rec/km2. The situations under which CF operator and carrier are guaranteed (η r >1) 
are more restrictive than the global profitability constraint (total cost savings).   
One of the facts that mostly affect the profitability of each stakeholder is the existence of a temporal 
access restriction. The results have demonstrated that the implementation of access restrictions increases 
the transportation cost of carriers and emissions in regular conditions (without CF). However, the 
implementation of the consolidation strategy measure may alleviate the negative impact of access 
restriction on carriers. Therefore, consolidation strategies may be a solution for those parcels that, because 
of the mandatory distribution time given by receivers, would be distributed when the access restriction is 
activated for regular carriers. The cost variations caused by the temporal restriction horizon (H) are much 
more important than the ones caused by the vehicle type (vans or electric cargo-bikes). In the numerical 
instances, we consider that the CF operator operated the local network with electric cargo-bikes, which 
has less unit vehicle cost. This fleet would have lesser impact on traffic since it can run along sidewalks 
and traffic calming streets. However, it may increase safety problems due to the coexistence with 
pedestrian flows. An interesting conclusion of our study is that the promotion of CF (UCC or uSA) does 
not necessary reduce the travel time and distance run by the gross commercial fleet. Therefore, as an 
opposite point to most guidelines, a general implementation of a consolidation facility does not always 
have to be justified as a policy driver to reduce traffic congestion. Therefore, the analytical model 
presented here will provide a useful tool to assess these variables and determine the potential impact on 
the traffic performance.  
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Appendix 1: Glossary 
 
A glossary of terms used in the methodological approach and test instances is presented: 
 
Notation Concept  Numerical values considered 
Demand and city input 
N Number of receivers (deliveries in a day)  1000 (100-2000) 
lx  ,ly Major and minor rectangle side length, (km) 3, 2 
A Area of the city (km2) 6 
𝛿𝛿  Density of receivers per unit of area 166.67(16.67-333.33) 
𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥  Maximal parcel volume allowed by carriers in regular distribution (m
3) 0.3 
𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥 Maximal parcel volume allowed by CF operator, (m
3) 0.24 (0-0.3) 
yk Volume of the parcel requested by each receiver k (k=1, …, N) - 
F(y) Cumulative distribution function of parcels where volume yk  ≤ymax - 
f(y) Probability density function of parcel volume - 
u k Volume of the parcel requested by each receiver k (k=1, …, N) served 
through CF facility 
- 
χL, χCF Regulation measures imposed by city council to carrier vehicles and CF 
operator vehicles respectively 
 
H Available time period for regular carriers to deliver parcels to receivers, (h) 8 (Scenario 1,2),  2.5 (Scenario 3) 
HCF Available time period for CF operator to deliver parcels to receivers, (h) 8 
Carrier input 
M Number of carrier companies serving the area 10 
ϕi  Market share of each carrier i (i=1,..,M)  ϕ1=0.2, ϕ2= ϕ3=0.05, ϕ i=0.1 
(i=4,.,10) 
Ni Number of retailers to be visited by carrier i (i=1,..M), (𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 = 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁) - 
𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖  Density of retailers served by carrier i (i=1,..M), (rec/km
2)  
ρ i Distance between the distribution center and the central point of the 
delivering area, (km) 
20 
VC,θC  Typology of vehicles used by carriers and transportation fare paid by 
suppliers/receivers to carriers respectively 
 
ct Unit temporal cost of regular carrier vehicle, (€/veh-h)*1 23.49 
cd Unit distance cost of regular carrier vehicle, (€/veh-km)*1 0.280 
C Volume capacity of regular carrier vehicle, (m3)*1 9 
v L, v LH Local speed of regular carriers within the service area, line-haul speed of 
regular carriers from distribution center to the service area, (km/h) 
20, 60 
τ Stop time per receiver in regular carriers distribution, (h) 0.05 
𝛽𝛽 Detour distance run by regular carriers per tour, (km) 0.10 
τ’ Stop time of carrier vehicle at CF due to the unloading operations of all 
parcels to be routed through CF, (h)   
0.25 
𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗(𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿), 
𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗(𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) emission factor of pollutant j corresponding to the carrier vehicle at cruising speed v (local) and v LH  (linehaul),  (g of  pollutant  j /veh-km)    
 CO 2 / NOx / PM2.5 Emission factor (g/veh-km)*2 in local distribution 293.32 / 0.724 / 0.00188 
 CO 2 / NOx / PM2.5 Emission factor (g/veh-km)*2 in line-haul distribution 193.026 / 0.626 / 0.00089 
CF operator input 
ϕ ix, ϕ iy Distance from CF location and central area in x, y coord., (km) 1, 1 
𝛿𝛿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  Density of receivers whose parcel is routed by CF, (rec/km
2)  
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  Unit temporal cost, (€/veh-h) *1 22.14 (Scen. 1), 15.54 (Scen.2,3) 
𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  Unit distance cost, (€/veh-km) 0.032  (Scen. 1), 0.015 (Scen.2,3) 
k C Capacity factor reduction  0.24 (Scen.1), 0.133(Scen.2-3) 
CCF Volume capacity of CF operator vehicles, (m3) CCF= k CC 2.16 (Scen.1), 1.20 (Scen.2-3) 
βCF Detour distance run by CF operator vehicle in each tour due to the 
allowable direction of street, (km) 
0.10 
Ω Facility cost, (€/day) 46.00                                                 
SCF Subsidy to CF operator (€/day) 0 
θCF Fare per parcel paid by carriers, (€/parcel) 1.000 
τCF Stop time per receiver served by CF operator vehicles in strategy B, (h) 0.025 
𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (𝑆𝑆 ) Emission factor of pollutant j corresponding to the CF operator vehicle at 
cruising speed v (amount of pollutant j /unit of distance)  
0 
Externalities $𝑗𝑗  Monetary cost of the impact of an amount of pollutant j on the society and 
the environment 
 
 Monetary CO2 Weighting factor (€/kg)*3 0.00768 
 Monetary NOx Weighting factor (€/kg)*4 6.3 
 Monetary PM2.5 Weighting factor (€/kg)*4 48 
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𝜀𝜀(𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿),
𝜀𝜀(𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)  Monetization of all emissions caused by carrier vehicle in one kilometer traveling at v L and v LH  speed respectively, (€/veh-km)  
𝜀𝜀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿) Monetization of all emissions caused by CF operator vehicle in one 
kilometer traveling at v L speed,  (€/veh-km) 
 
Output Variables 
S Shipment volume served in each tour by regular carriers, (m3) 
2w Width of the delivery zone associated to one tour,  (km) 
P Length of the delivery zone associated to one tour, (km) 
d, t Average distance run and travel time spent per receiver, (km), (h) 
Z Total transportation cost of one carrier in one day, (€/day) 
D L , D LH Total local distance and  line haul distance of regular carrier fleet respectively, (km) 
T Total travel time of regular carrier fleet (h) 
𝜓𝜓,𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴  Maximal number of receivers that a regular carrier vehicle of capacity C can visit along H time horizon 
(rec/tour) 
𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶
𝐴𝐴, Z C,i Total costs of M carriers in strategy A and Cost of individual carrier i (i=1,..,M) in strategy A, respectively 
(€/day) 
𝑍𝑍𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴  Total externalities (emission-related) caused by the carrier fleet in strategy A, (€/day) 
𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿,𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 ,𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴  Local distance and line-haul distance of the fleet of carrier i (i=1,..,M) in strategy A  (km) 
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝐴 Travel time of the fleet of carrier i (i=1,..,M) in strategy A (h) 
𝜓𝜓𝐵𝐵  Maximal number of receivers that one carrier vehicle of capacity C can carry to the consolidation facility  
along H time horizon in strategy B.  
𝜓𝜓𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  Maximal number of receivers that one CF operator vehicle of capacity CCF can distribute to the city  along HCF 
time horizon in strategy B 
𝜓𝜓𝑅𝑅  Maximal number of receivers that one regular carrier vehicle of capacity C can distribute to the receivers 
located within the city  along H time horizon in strategy B,  
∆𝜌𝜌 Extra distance to be run by traditional carrier fleet in the line-haul phase due to the uncentered location of CF 
operator. 
𝜌𝜌𝑢𝑢  Extra distance to be run by CF operator fleet in the line-haul phase due to the uncentered location of CF 
operator.  
𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶
𝐵𝐵 Total cost of traditional carriers in strategy B,  (€/day) 
𝑍𝑍𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝐵𝐵   Transportation cost of traditional carriers in strategy B in the link distribution center-CF, (€/day) 
𝑍𝑍𝜃𝜃
𝐵𝐵 Total expenses of carriers associated to the fare paid to the CF operator for using the CF, (€/day) 
 ZCF Total costs of the CF operator for last-mile distribution in strategy B, (€/day) 
𝑍𝑍𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
𝐵𝐵  Total externalities (emission-related) caused by all commercial vehicles in strategy B, (€/day) 
𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶
𝑅𝑅 Total cost of regular carriers in strategy B that serve those parcels directly to the final receiver,  (€/day)  𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ,𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 , 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 
 
Line-haul distance and travel time of the fleet of carrier i (i=1,..,M) in strategy B, respectively. 
𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿 ,𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 ,𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ,𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 , 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 
 
Local distance, line-haul distance and travel time of the fleet of carrier i (i=1,..,M) in regular distribution under 
strategy B, respectively. 
𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ,𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 , 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  
 
Local distance, line-haul distance and travel time of the fleet of CF operator in strategy B, respectively. 
∆𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖  Additional number of vehicles of regular carrier i (i=1,..,M)  needed to distribute parcels directly to receivers 
in Strategy B, ∆𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0 
  *1 In accordance with the of the road freight transport observatory in Catalonia, Generalitat de Catalunya (2015).  
*2 In accordance with EMEP/EEA (2013), assuming EURO V Light commercial vehicles <3.5T,Tier 3 analysis 
method, 
*3 Average value for year 2015, In accordance with SENDECO2 (2016). 
*4 In accordance with European Commission DG Environment (2000)  
 
Appendix 2: Lagrangean formulation 
The Lagrangean formulation of the tour design problem is presented here. To estimate the local length of 
a tour as a function of w and S, we extend the contributions of Daganzo (1984a) and divide the rectangle 
into two bands each of width w. Then, each route visits points in non-decreasing coordinate x along the 
length of the rectangle in the inbound direction and decreasing x in the outbound direction (See Figure 2). 
If points are randomly distributed over space, one can evaluate the expected total distance. As distances 
are computed in L1  metric, we split the total distance into the traverse and the longitudinal components 
that will be calculated independently. 
Equation (A.1) determines the objective function to be minimized for a single carrier. The decision 
variables are the dimension of the vehicle zone delivery partition (w) and the vehicle volume load (S). 
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min
𝑤𝑤 ,𝑆𝑆 𝑁𝑁 ��𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑 + 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� 2𝜌𝜌𝐸𝐸 (𝑦𝑦)𝑆𝑆 + �𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑 + 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿� 1𝑤𝑤𝛿𝛿 + �𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑 + 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿� 𝑤𝑤3 + �𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑 + 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿� 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦)𝑆𝑆 + 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡� (A.1) 
𝑆𝑆 ≤ 𝐶𝐶 (A.2) 2𝜌𝜌
𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
+ 𝛽𝛽
𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿
+ 𝑆𝑆
𝑤𝑤𝛿𝛿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦) + 𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆3𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦) + 𝜏𝜏𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦) ≤ 𝐿𝐿 (A.3) 
𝑤𝑤, 𝑆𝑆 ≥ 0 continuous (A.4) 
Inequality constraints (A.2)–(A.3) capture the limitations on the capacity of the vehicles, C, and the 
available time horizon, H, to visit all receivers. Constraint (A.4) states the non-negative nature of the 
decision variables. 
The constrained minimization problem stated in Equations (A.1)-(A.4) can be solved by means of 
Lagrange relaxation technique. If we reformulate the constraints (A.2)-(A.3) to be equalities in the form 
of 𝑔𝑔1 (𝑤𝑤 , 𝑆𝑆) = 𝐶𝐶 − 𝑆𝑆, 𝑔𝑔2 (𝑤𝑤 , 𝑆𝑆) = 𝐿𝐿 − �2𝜌𝜌𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦) + 𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆3𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦) + 𝛽𝛽𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿 + 𝜏𝜏𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦)� respectively, and define the 
Lagrange multipliers 𝜆𝜆1, 𝜆𝜆2; the corresponding relaxed problem is defined in Equations (A.5)-(A.10). 
Equation (A.5) is the Lagrange function and Equations (A.6)-(A.10) plus (A.2)-(A.4) are optimality 
conditions, where 𝜋𝜋 = �𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑 + 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿�  and  𝜀𝜀 = �𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑 + 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�.  
ℒ(𝑤𝑤,𝑆𝑆,𝜆𝜆1,𝜆𝜆2) = 𝑁𝑁 �2𝜌𝜌𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦)𝜀𝜀𝑆𝑆 + 𝜋𝜋𝑤𝑤𝛿𝛿 +𝑤𝑤𝜋𝜋3 + 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦)𝜋𝜋𝑆𝑆 +𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝜏𝜏� − 𝜆𝜆1𝑔𝑔1(𝑤𝑤,𝑆𝑆) −𝜆𝜆2𝑔𝑔2(𝑤𝑤,𝑆𝑆) (A.5) 
𝜕𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤
= 𝑁𝑁𝜋𝜋 �13 − 1𝛿𝛿𝑤𝑤2� + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦)𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿 �13 − 1𝛿𝛿𝑤𝑤2� = 0 (A.6) 
𝜕𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆
= − 2𝑁𝑁𝜀𝜀𝜌𝜌𝐸𝐸 (𝑦𝑦)
𝑆𝑆2
−
𝛽𝛽𝑁𝑁𝜋𝜋𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦)
𝑆𝑆2
+ 𝜆𝜆1 + 𝜆𝜆2� 𝑤𝑤3𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦)𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿 + 1𝛿𝛿𝑤𝑤2𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦)𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿 + 𝜏𝜏𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦)� = 0 (A.7) 
𝜆𝜆1(𝑆𝑆 − 𝐶𝐶) = 0 (A.8) 
𝜆𝜆2�𝐿𝐿 − �
2𝜌𝜌
𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
+ 𝛽𝛽
𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿
+ 𝑆𝑆
𝑤𝑤𝛿𝛿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦) + 𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆3𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦) + 𝑆𝑆𝜏𝜏𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦)�� = 0  (A.9) 
𝜆𝜆1 ≥ 0; 𝜆𝜆2 ≥ 0 (A.10) 
In this problem, there are two complementarity conditions (Equations 10-11) regarding the former 
constraints. They generate four cases to check the optimal values of the four variables involved w,S, 𝜆𝜆1 , 
𝜆𝜆2, satisfying Constraints (A.2)-(A.4), and (A.10): (𝜆𝜆1 = 0 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑  𝑔𝑔2 = 0;𝜆𝜆2 = 0 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑  𝑔𝑔1 = 0; 𝜆𝜆1 =0 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑  𝜆𝜆2 = 0; 𝑔𝑔2 = 0 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑  𝑔𝑔1 = 0). However, only the two first cases are feasible, providing the 
following optimal vector of optimal results: (𝑤𝑤 , 𝑆𝑆, 𝜆𝜆1,𝜆𝜆2)1∗ =
��3
𝑤𝑤
�
1/2 , 𝐿𝐿− 2𝜌𝜌𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿−𝛽𝛽/𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿2
√3𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦)𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿𝛿𝛿1/2+ 𝜏𝜏𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦), 0, (2𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌+𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽)𝐸𝐸2 (𝑦𝑦)𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆2� 2√3𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿𝛿𝛿1/2+𝜏𝜏��, (𝑤𝑤, 𝑆𝑆 , 𝜆𝜆1,𝜆𝜆2)2∗ = ��3𝑤𝑤�1/2 , 𝐶𝐶 , (2𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌+𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽)𝐸𝐸 (𝑦𝑦)𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶2 , 0� . Note that the 
values of the decision variables (w,S) and the Lagrange multipliers are always positive for both optimal 
solutions. There is one exception in the value of S in the first optimal solution: when the travel time in the 
line-haul phase of one area (2𝜌𝜌/𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) plus the time needed for detouring (𝛽𝛽/𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿) is greater than the 
available time horizon (H). In this case, there is not a feasible solution since there is not enough time to 
perform the local distribution. Therefore, in the estimation of cost incurred by carrier, the band width will 
be equal to 𝑤𝑤 = �3
𝑤𝑤
�
1/2
 whereas the number of receivers visited in each route will be 𝜓𝜓 = 𝑆𝑆[𝐸𝐸 (𝑦𝑦)] =
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �
𝐶𝐶[𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦)] ; 𝐿𝐿−2𝜌𝜌/𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿−𝛽𝛽/𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿2
√3𝛿𝛿𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿
+𝜏𝜏
�. The latter decision variable will vary depending on whether Constraint (A.3) 
is tight or not. In this modeling approach, the required number of carrier routes entering the city has been 
estimated by the real term 𝑁𝑁/𝜓𝜓 although this is an integer value in reality. This mathematical 
approximation should be allowed when N>> 𝜓𝜓. 
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Appendix 3: Factor diagrams 
The estimations of the factors to be used in Equations (26), (28), and (30) are provided in the following 
Figures. 
  
Figure A1. Estimation of parameter A 2,i  when a) C=9m3 and b) C=4.2m3 
  
Figure A2. Estimation of parameter B2,i when a) C=9m3 and b) C=4.2m3  
  
Figure A3. Estimation of parameter C2,i when a) C=9m3 and b) C=4.2m3   
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Figure A4. Estimation of parameter A 3 when a) CCF=2.16m3 and b) CCF=1.2m3 
 
 
Figure A5. Estimation of parameter B3 
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